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The security research community has recently recognised that user behaviour plays a 
part in many security failures, and it has become common to refer to users as the 
“weakest link in the security chain”.  We argue that simply blaming users will not lead 
to more effective security systems.  Security designers must identify the causes of 
undesirable user behaviour, and address these to design effective security systems. We 
present examples of how undesirable user behaviour with passwords can be caused by 
failure to recognise the characteristics of human memory, unattainable or conflicting 
task demands, and lack of support, training and motivation.  We conclude that existing 
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) knowledge and techniques can be used to prevent 
or address these problems, and outline a vision of a holistic design approach for usable 
and effective security. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
With the exponential growth of networked systems and applications 
such as e-commerce, the demand for effective computer security is 
increasing.  At the same time, the number and seriousness of security 
problems reported over the past couple of years indicates that 
organisations are more vulnerable than ever.   In many of the reported 
cases, user behaviour enabled or facilitated the security breach.  The 
security research community – which hitherto largely ignored the human 
factor – now acknowledges that 
 
“Security is only as good as it’s weakest link, and people are 
the weakest link in the chain.” (Schneier, 2000). 
 
The opposition recognized and exploited this state of affairs earlier.  
Kevin Mitnick, arguably the world’s most famous hacker, testified to the 
US Senate committee that he had obtained more password by tricking  
users than by cracking.  In his new role as security evangelist, he never 
ceases to point out that: 
 
“The human side of computer security is easily exploited and 
constantly overlooked. Companies spend millions of dollars 
on firewalls, encryption and secure access devices, and it’s 
money wasted, because none of these measures address the 
weakest link in the security chain.” (Poulsen, 2000). 
 
The first implication of this new perspective on security is that the 
traditional security approach – to address the problem by developing 
more, and more complex, technology - is not sufficient.  We agree with 
this conclusion. However, labelling users as the “weakest link” implies 
that they are to blame.  In our view, this is a repeat of the “human error” 
mindset that blighted the development of safety-critical systems until the 
late eighties (Reason, 1990). Consider the following examples of users 
violating password rules:  
 
1. A user is told that his password has expired, and he must 
change it immediately or be locked out of the system - he 
feels stumped, and ends up choosing his wife’s name. This is 
exploited by a colleague who wants to look at files he has no 
permission to access. He tries out the user’s family member’s 
names to get into the system, and succeeds.  Many password 
systems “ambush” users without warning.  People have 
difficulty designing and memorising strong passwords, and 
they have even more difficulty under pressure.   
2. An aircraft designer needs to access 6 different systems; 
company policy states she must have a different password for 
each.  The system only accepts strong passwords, and 
requires a change each month.  Recently, she was 
reprimanded by her boss for missing an important deadline –
she worked on a Sunday but could not get to some files 
because she could not recall the right password and couldn’t 
get help.  She now keeps a note with her current passwords 
under her mouse mat, where an industrial spy working as a 
contract cleaner finds it and uses the passwords to download 
confidential design drawings. The security mechanism and 
policy created a memory task impossible to the user (at least 
without instructions or training).  When failure at the 
memory task interfered with her work, the organisation failed 
to recognise and address it. The user was left with two 
conflicting goals and forced to relegate security to secondary 
position. 
3. A hacker calls company employees and tells them that he 
works for IT support and needs their password to update 
some programs on their machine. Since no admin accounts 
have been set up on many PCs in this company, IT support 
staff often need to ask users for their passwords when they 
want to get into these machines.  This is an a contextual issue 
– if systems are set up so users are regularly asked to disclose 
their passwords, it is difficult for them to distinguish in which 
context disclosure is safe, and when it is not. 
 
These examples illustrate issues that are often overlooked in security 
design. As Adams & Sasse (1999) pointed out, security has largely 
ignored usability issues; many users of security systems face 
unattainable or conflicting demands, and receive no support or training. 
A Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) design approach takes into 
account that users and technology work together completing a task (in 
order to achieve a goal) in a physical and social context.  Any specific 
user, technology, task and context may bring constraints to the design 
problem. In the remainder of the paper, we systematically examine the  
 
• technology 
• user,  
• goals and tasks, 
• contextual  
issues involved in security design, and outline how HCI knowledge can 
be employed to address them.  Whilst these issues can affect any 
security mechanism, we are using examples from our research on one 
specific mechanism – passwords – to illustrate them.  Our 
recommendations are based on an analysis of the relevant literature, and 
empirical findings from the following 4 studies:  
1. We collected questionnaires from 144 BT employees (half at 
management grade or above), who were asked to describe the 
cause of the last password problem they encountered and that led 
to a password reset.  They were also asked to report their number 
of overall passwords at work and how they used them. 
2. We analysed 6 months of password reset logs from the BT 
password helpdesk. 
3. We carried out in-depth interviews on attitudes to passwords 
with 17 users. 10 were BT employees, 6 were Ph.D. students at 
UCL, and one a systems administrator working in finance. The 
interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes and were 
subsequently transcribed for analysis. 
4. We carried out a study of 32 students using a web-based system 
to practice and submit assessed coursework (Brostoff & Sasse, 
2000).  System logs of password and Passfaces (see 3.1.3) use 
allowed us to study not only frequency of logins and login 
failures, but also what caused the wrong selection. 
 
2 Technology  
 
There are 5 ways to authenticate users (see the paper by Rejman-Greene 
in this issue); most security mechanisms use a 2-step procedure in which 
identification and authentication are combined.  An example of such 
combination are cash cards (token-based identification) combined with a 
PIN (knowledge-based authentication).  By far the most common access 
control mechanism in computing is the combination of a userid 
(identification) and password (authentication).   
 
2.1 Password Implementation 
 
Most password systems are implemented in the same way: 
• The mechanism issues a userid for every new user, and also a 
password (which can be changed by the user to one of his/her 
choice). The password is supposed to be a secret shared between the 
user and the computer only; it should not be disclosed or written 
down. 
• To log on, the user has to enter her userid and password. The system 
processes the entry and compares this to the entries it has stored.  If 
it finds a match, the user will be given access to the computer 
system.  If there is no match, the user will not be allowed access; she 
may have to contact a system administrator to have a new password 
issued.  Many systems suspend an account after 3 or 5 unsuccessful 
login attempts, and bar further attempts until the account has been 
re-set. 
 
From a technical point of view, the password mechanism is a low-cost 
option, and one whose risks are well understood.  It is also a mechanism 
many users are familiar with.  However, there are also a number of 
usability issues connected to its use. 
• Password mechanisms are usually implemented on a per-system 
basis. This means that users need to log into each password-
protected system individually; the time required to log into a 
number of systems several times a day can add up.  Some 
operating systems store userid and password and automatically 
and use it on the user's behalf (for example to mount remote 
volumes).  
• The growing number of systems that users have to interact with 
creates memory problems (see section 3.1).  The problem is often 
exacerbated by password policies, usually based on Federal 
Information Processing Guidelines (FIPS, 1985).  These rules 
state, for instance that 
o Passwords must be strong, i.e. a pseudo-random mixture 
of letters, numbers and characters. 
o Users should have a different password for each system. 
o Passwords should be changed at regular intervals, and 
accounts of users who do not comply deleted or 
suspended. 
• The variability of userids and passwords across different 
systems: Unix takes up to 8 characters, Windows 95/98 up to 14, 
and Windows 2000 up to 127.  Some system have highly 
elaborate content restrictions (e.g. “there must be at least three 
non-letter characters in the password, and letter 4, 5, or 6 must 
be such a character”), but these vary from system to system. 
The result is a huge demand on users’ memory: 
• Users not only have to remember passwords, but also which 
system and userid it is associated with.   
• Users have to remember which password restrictions apply to 
which system.  
• Users have to remember whether they have changed a password 
on a particular system, and what they have changed it to.  
It is thus not difficult to accept that many users cannot cope.  As a result, 
the cost of re-setting passwords has reached significant levels in BT and 
elsewhere.  In response to rising cost and user protests, many 
organisations give users permission - or even direct them – to write their 
passwords down and keep them in a safe place.  This violates the first 
principle of knowledge-based authentication – that the password should 
exist only in two places – in the system (in encrypted form) and the 
users’ mind. 
A technical solution to reduce the number of passwords is a single sign-
on (SSO) login system, which many companies are starting to deploy.  
This reduces not only users’ memory load, but also the total number of 
time users spend on logins.  If SSO is not feasible (e.g. because of cost), 
allocating users a single userid for all systems, standardising passwords 
rules, and enforcing them consistently can improve the situation 
somewhat. Most security policies decree that users should have different 
passwords for different systems, to limit the number of systems 
compromised if an unauthorised person gets hold of a password. From a 
usability point of view, allowing users to have the same password on 
different systems is desirable because it increases frequency of use and 
memorability (see section 2). Ultimately, this makes for more effective 
security because it gives users a chance to have strong passwords they 
can remember, and a strong password reduces the chances of it being 
compromised in the first place.  
 
 
3 Users 
 
3.1 Memorability issues 
 
The primary user characteristic that impacts password design is 
memorability. There is a huge body of research on human memory, but 
the most important issues related to passwords can be summarised as 
follows: 
 
1. The capacity of working memory is limited. 
2. Memory decays over time; this means people may not recall an item, 
or not recall it 100% correctly. 
3. Recognition of a familiar item is easier than unaided recall. 
4. Frequently recalled items are easier to remember than infrequently 
used ones, and retrieval of very frequently recalled items becomes 
“automatic”. 
5. People cannot “forget on demand” – items will linger in memory 
even then they are no longer needed. 
6. Items that are meaningful (such as words) are easier to recall than 
non-meaningful ones (sequences of letters and numbers that have no 
particular meaning). 
7. Distinct items can be associated with each other to facilitate recall; 
however, similar items compete against each other on recall.  
 
Knowledge-based authentication mechanisms, such as passwords, 
require users to memorise items and recall them when accessing a 
specific system.  Asking users to recall a single password and userid for 
one system may seem reasonable, but with the proliferation of 
passwords, users are increasingly unable to cope.  
 
3.1.1 Password problems 
Before study 2, BT security staff believed that the rising number of 
password resets was due to a small number of careless ‘repeat 
offenders’– by their own definition, employees who ask for a reset 6 or 
more times a month.  Study 2 found that 91.7% of resets were caused by 
“normal users” – i.e. more than 90% of users cannot cope with the 
password mechanism in the way they were expected to – which is a 
rather damning result in terms of usability of password mechanisms. The 
study also found that 30% of the “repeat offender” helpdesk calls could 
be traced back to temporary staff, and were largely due to administrative 
(rather than memory) problems. 
 
Study 1 is the first systematic study of passwords in a population of real 
users during their normal work. The average number of passwords per 
user was 16. We asked users to describe the cause of their last password 
problem, as well as the frequency with which they used the password.  
The responses were then categorised according to these frequencies into 
three groups: light use (from once per year to just under once a month), 
medium use (from once a month to once a day) and heavy use (used 
more frequently than once a day).  The results are shown in Figure1.  
Our data support the findings from the Web survey by Adams et al. 
(1997), in which users reported that infrequently used passwords are the 
ones that are most often forgotten. 
  
0   
Forgetting
Confusion
10   
20   
30   
40   
50   
60   
70   
Light  Use   Medium  Use   Heavy Use  
Technical/Organisational 
 
 
Figure 1 - Frequency and cause of problems with passwords 
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Figure 2 - Frequency and causes of problems with 6-digit PIN 
 
Study 1 also demonstrated the effect of password content.  Figure 2 
illustrates problems with a voicemail system using a six-digit PIN.  The 
proportion of reported incidences where this PIN could not be 
remembered was very high – even when it was moderately or heavily 
used.  While frequently used computer passwords can be recalled after 
periods of non-use, even heavily used PINs are forgotten after short 
periods of non-use.   
 
In the discussion to date, login failure has been usually described as 
“users forgetting passwords”.  Studies 3 and 4 found, however, that 
users hardly ever draw a complete blank: the login usually fails because 
1. they recall the password partly, but not 100% correctly, or 
2. they recall a different password from the one required, i.e. 
o a previously used password for the same machine, or  
o a password for a different machine. 
 
This shows the basic memory mechanisms (see Section 3.1) in action: 
items decay in memory unless they are frequently recalled, and recall of 
similar items causes interference.  The likelihood of 100% correct recall 
of infrequently used items is extremely low.  This means that a password 
mechanism that demands 100% accurate recall every time is an 
extremely bad match for infrequently-used passwords.  That the results 
for 6-digit PINs are even worse confirms the importance of password 
content.  It also indicates that a token-PIN combination, often touted as a 
more usable replacement for passwords, is likely to cause more 
problems with infrequently used systems than a standard password. 
 
Heavy- or medium-use passwords were more often confused than lightly 
used passwords (see Figure 1).  Heavily used passwords were more 
often confused than they were forgotten.  And PINs are more frequently 
confused with each other than passwords (see Figure 2).  Frequency of 
execution is one of the key considerations when matching technology to 
users’ tasks (see Section 4), but has to date rarely been taken into 
account in security.  Our findings provide a powerful argument that 
existing mechanisms are a bad match for systems that are not accessed 
on a daily basis, and that this causes the vast majority of password 
problems. 
 
The results from study 1 and 2 suggest that the other major cause of 
password resets are forced password changes.  13% of all reported 
password problems occurred just after changing a PIN.  Moreover, the 
more frequently the PIN was used, the more problems occur after 
changing it.  Approximately the same number of problems occurred just 
after changing medium- and heavily used passwords, whereas there were 
fewer problems with infrequently-used passwords.  There has been no 
systematic investigation of the impact of forced password changes on 
numbers of resets and password strength.  The studies reported in this 
paper provide some evidence that they make a significant contribution to 
password problems.  The qualitative data in study 3 suggests that 
password quality declines with frequency of forced changes: as users 
become increasingly desperate in their quest for a password or PIN that 
stands out, their choices become more guessable. 
 
3.1.2 Can passwords be strong AND memorable? 
 
Both security (Schneier, 2000) and usability experts (Nielsen, 2000) 
have stated that recalling strong passwords is a humanly impossible task 
because strong passwords are non-meaningful items and hence 
inherently difficult to remember.  However, what makes a password 
easy to guess or crack is the fact that it is meaningful to many other 
people, as well as the password owner.  It is possible to create passwords 
that are strong and meaningful: pseudo-random combinations of letters, 
numbers and characters that are meaningless to anyone but the password 
owner/creator.  Many systems administrators use system-generated 
passwords for maximum security, and generate a sentence that describes, 
for instance, their opinion of a particular character in Star Trek (e.g. 
m,1aNib7 becomes “Me, I am NOT impressed by SevenofNine”).  They 
can manage a reasonable number of passwords by having different 
themes for different systems.   For heavily used passwords, these pass 
algorithms seem to work well (Haskett, 1984).   
  
Zviran & Haga (1993) obtained good recall results using a similar 
method with ordinary users, by giving them instructions to concatenate 
several words and interspersing them with characters for user-generated 
passwords (e.g. BF$gat0 for Black Forest Gateau).  As part of our own 
research, we have incorporated a related set of rules into an online 
password tutorial.  We have not completed an objective performance test 
(in terms of password strength and recall rates), but have received 
feedback that these rules helped users with password construction 
(“finally, I have a way of generating passwords the system will accept!”) 
and recall. 
 
3.1.3 Alternative knowledge-based authentication systems 
 
One of the most fundamental HCI principles is to avoid unaided recall 
wherever possible, since it is known to place a considerable burden on 
users’ cognitive load and overall ability to perform. There are 
authentication mechanisms that use cued recall and recognition, e.g.: 
• Composite weak authentication: Many banks ask their customers to 
identify themselves by providing several weak but memorable items; 
this method may be used in combination with a password, and/or as 
a backup method if the password has been forgotten. 
• Cognitive passwords (Zviran & Haga, 1990) involve a series of 
questions about the users personal preferences and history.  After a 
certain number of correct answers, the user is considered to have 
passed authentication.   
• Associative passwords (Zviran & Haga, 1993) employ word pair or 
phrase associations in a similar manner (e.g. Dear-God, Spring-Step, 
Black-White) while avoiding word association stereotypes.  Ellison 
et al. (1999) refer to systems such as these that use the contents of 
episodic memory as employing personal entropy.   
• The pass sentence mechanism (Spector & Ginzberg, 1994) is an 
unaided recall mechanism in the first place.  However, if the user 
does not get the secret completely right, the user is prompted with 
questions about the pass sentence.  When the user answers enough 
questions correctly, s/he is logged in.  
 
Systems based on recognition of visual items for authentication have 
received much attention recently. 
 
• v-GO® (Passlogix®, Inc, 2001) presents users with a visual 
scene.  To authenticate, the user clicks on certain objects in the 
scene in particular order.  The user is able to create a story using 
the objects in the scene, a mnemonic technique which aids the 
user in recalling the correct sequence of objects.  v-GO® appears 
to have had only cursory analytic evaluation. 
• Both Deja Vu (Dahmija, 2000) and Passfaces™ (ID-Arts) present 
users with panels of images, from which they have to recognise 
and select their pass images.  The most significant difference 
between the two systems is the content of the images.  Deja Vu 
employs randomly generated art, while Passfaces uses 
photographs of strangers’ faces in an attempt to exploit people’s 
ability to process and remember faces.   
 
These systems have performed well in laboratory-style test, producing 
recall rates of up to 80% even after up to 3 months of non-use 
(Valentine, 1990; 1998).  However, these results must be treated with 
caution because users in these trials were given one set of cues; this 
means there are no similar cues to confuse them with.  Unpublished 
trials with multiple cues indicate that problems similar to those with 
passwords occur when users are given several similar visual clues, or 
have to change them.  In addition, the graphics involved in these systems 
require significant bandwidth and network resources; when these are not 
present, login time can increase significantly, which in turn interferes 
with users’ task (Brostoff & Sasse, 2000).   
 
3.2 User Knowledge and Motivation 
 
Adams & Sasse (1999) investigated users’ perceptions of password 
mechanisms to identify the human and organisational factors that impact 
on the security and usability of password mechanisms. They found that 
many users’ knowledge was shockingly inadequate, which leads to them 
constructing their own, often wildly inaccurate model of possible 
security threats and the importance of security. This, in turn, gives rise to 
a wide variety of user behaviour that is undesirable in terms of security. 
Studies 1 and 3 confirmed this state of affairs.  It is therefore not 
surprising that “user education” has appeared on top of the to-do list of 
many security departments.  However, this will require more than 
pushing documents to users.   
From the task perspective (see Section 4), security is an enabling task, 
i.e. a task that needs to be completed in order to be able to perform the 
main task.  Authentication is an enabling task that needs to be completed 
to get to the resources required to do real work. It is easy to see that for 
many users today, security is something that gets in the way of real 
work, especially when mechanisms are difficult to use, and/or the need 
for security is not obvious.  Users have to be motivated to make the 
additional effort that is required to use security mechanisms properly.  
Small business or home users can be motivated to a certain extent by 
education about the risks of not bothering with security. This allows 
them to make an informed choice about their behaviour, based on an 
assessment of the risks to them personally and the effort required to 
reduce these risks. This is different for large organisations (see Section 
5). Users are generally less concerned about security of their 
organisation’s computer systems, and often choose to follow existing 
policies only selectively or not at all.  
In order to develop effective means of educating and motivating users 
with respect to password mechanisms, we tried to understand the 
mindset of users at which such measures will be targeted. In study 3, we 
identified 7 issues that lead to undesirable password behaviour:  
1. Identity issues: People who exhibit good password behaviour are 
often described as ‘paranoid’, ‘pedantic’ or ‘the kind of person who 
doesn’t trust anybody’ – even by themselves. Some participants are 
proud of the fact that they do not understand security (‘I’m not a 
nerd’), or do not comply with regulations (‘I don’t just follow 
orders’). 
2. Social issues: Sharing your password is forby many users a sign of 
trust in their colleagues – you share your password with people you 
trust, and somebody refusing to share their password with you is 
effectively telling you that they do not trust you. The same goes for 
other password-related behaviour, such as locking your screen when 
you leave your computer for a few minutes – you are telling your 
colleague next to you that you don’t trust him. 
3. ‘Nobody will target me’: Most users think the data stored on their 
system is not important enough to become the target of a hacker or 
industrial spy. Hackers, for example, are assumed to target ‘rich and 
famous’ people or institutions. Some users accept that hackers might 
target somebody like them just to get into the overall system and try 
to get further from there, but clearly do not regard this as very likely, 
purely because of the number of users that could be targeted this 
way. 
4. ‘They could not do much damage anyway’: Most users do not think 
that somebody getting into their account could cause any serious 
harm to them or their organization. 
5. Informal work procedures: Current password mechanisms and 
regulations often clash with formal or informal work procedures (e.g. 
if you get ill and cannot come in, somebody in your group should be 
able to access your account and take care of your customers). 
6. Accountability: Most users are aware that their behaviour does not 
fully comply with security regulations. However, they do not expect 
to be made accountable because they regard the regulations as 
“unrealistic” and their behaviour as “common practice”. In addition, 
they know that there always is a chance that a hacker will break into 
their system, however well they behave. They can always claim that 
it was not their misbehaviour that led to the break-in. Some users 
realize that they might be held accountable for past behaviour (e.g. 
writing down their password) if somebody gets into their system 
now. 
7. Double-binds: If a computer system has strong security mechanisms, 
it is more likely to come under attack from hackers who want to 
prove themselves, and who will in the end find a way to get in. If it 
has weak security, inexperienced hackers who try to break into many 
systems without targeting one specifically might get in. Similarly, if 
you follow rules (e.g., lock your screen), people will think you have 
valuable data on you computer, and are more likely to try to break in. 
It you do not follow regulations, it is easier for somebody to break 
in. 
 
An additional interesting result of study 3 was that there are users who 
show good behaviour even though they are of the opinion that this is not 
necessary. They follow regulations because they perceive it as necessary 
to maintain their professional reputation, or because they believe that 
any security failure involving their employer would ultimately reduce its 
standing in the business world.  This insight provides a potential basis 
for further educational and motivational measures.  A more drastic 
approach would be to link organisational security to users’ personal data, 
by providing access to payroll, health records and personal email - all 
users in study 3stated such data was worthy of good security behaviour. 
 
 
4 Goals and Tasks 
 
Consideration of user’s goals and tasks is the key element of a user-
centred approach to design.  Technology is not an end in itself, but 
should work in tandem with users to achieve an individual’s or 
organisation’s goals; these goals need to be identified to ensure that 
user-system interaction is designed to be effective, i.e. produces the 
required output. Goals are achieved through the completion of tasks; 
technology designers study tasks to ensure that user-system interaction is 
designed to be efficient, i.e. can be completed as quickly as possible and 
without waste of resources.  An analysis of goals and tasks typically 
identifies:  
1. the goals (desired output)  
2. fundamental tasks (without which the desired output cannot be 
achieved), 
3. enabling tasks (which have to be completed in order to be able to 
carry out a fundamental task), 
4. performance criteria for each task (e.g. speed of completion, 
maximum number of errors), 
5. frequency with which each task is carried out, 
6. resources required by users and technology to carry out the task. 
 
The insights gained through such analysis provide essential input into 
the design process. Fundamental tasks, for instance, are given priority in 
terms of visibility and feedback, and frequent tasks need to be 
particularly efficient in execution.  Another fundamental principle of 
good design is to apportion tasks to users and technology in line with 
their strengths and weaknesses (e.g. limitations of human memory, see 
Section 2.1). 
 
4.1 Tasks and passwords  
 
Many of the problems users have with security mechanisms can be 
explained in terms of a bad match between the mechanisms and users’ 
goals and tasks.  Users’ behaviour is essentially goal-driven.  If the 
benefits of an enabling task are not obvious to users, they will view it as 
something that gets in the way of completing the fundamental task, and 
find ways of cutting it out if possible.  The studies by Whitten & Tygar 
(1999) and Adams & Sasse (1999) described this phenomenon for PGP 
encryption and password mechanisms, respectively. And whether or not 
it is possible to bypass an enabling task, the extra effort required will 
foster resentment in users, and feed the perception that security is “not 
sensible” because it interferes with real work.  This, in turn, reduces user 
motivation (see Section 2.3), which in the longer terms leads to an 
erosion of security culture (see Section 5.2). 
 
All our studies provided evidence of how badly matched password 
mechanisms currently are to users’ capabilities and their tasks.  This is 
because password mechanisms, and the policies that govern their use, 
are currently designed and chosen as general mechanisms to protect 
access to systems, and without reference to the work that is being 
performed. Infrequently used passwords, for example, would be better 
served by a mechanism that does not require 100% accurate recall of 
strong memory items, i.e. accepts partly successful authentication, a 
combination of weak items, or relies on recognition (see Sections 3.1.1 
and 3.1.3).  More tolerant mechanisms would also work better in 
conjunction with high-speed, high-pressure tasks, which have an 
increased likelihood of user slips. 
Current mechanisms generally do not acknowledge the cost of 
authentication failure for fundamental tasks. Users and organisations can 
suffer significant losses as a result of not being able to access a system 
needed for a fundamental task because of authentication failure.  If there 
is no contingency when legitimate users are unable to gain access, they 
are left to invent their own, such as borrowing a colleague’s password – 
there was plenty of evidence for this in studies 1 and 3.  There may be 
help desks or system administrators, but if a re-set takes 15 mins to 
complete, and an important customer wants a quote now, this is not a 
valid contingency. 
Consequently, security must be designed as an integral part of the 
system that supports a particular work activity in order to be effective 
and efficient.  Decisions about system and file access must be based on 
how tasks and workflow are organised in the real world.  In modern 
organisations, many tasks are assigned to teams, and teamwork and 
collaboration are encouraged.  If users are then given individual 
passwords, and unable to access each other’s files even though they are 
needed for shared tasks, password disclose will become common.   
Finally, a task-centred design recognises that support resources, such as 
instructions and help, need to be available at the point where users need 
them.  Instructions for constructing and memorising a good password, 
for instance, should be available when a password needs to be chosen or 
changed. And the instructions, as well as labels on any tools, need to be 
compatible with users’ vocabulary (Whitten & Tygar, 1999). 
 
 
5 Context 
 
An effective and efficient design of a user-technology interaction will be 
largely determined by the goals of that interaction and the tasks required 
to complete it.  Beyer & Holtzblatt (1997) identified a host of physical 
and social factors that need to be considered and accommodated to 
design an effective system.  This section presents a number of points that 
are relevant to password security. 
 
5.1 Physical environment 
 
The physical environment in which password mechanisms are used can 
influence user behaviour.  Adams & Sasse (1999) found that if the 
physical security environment has obvious flaws, users may feel that it is 
not worth bothering with passwords (‘after all, anyone can get in here’).  
A strong physical security environment can lead to complacency, which 
needs to be counteracted by reminding users of risks facing the 
organization (see Section 5.2). 
 
Presence of others is an important consideration: 
 
• Users may worry about how they appear to others (e.g. 
‘paranoid’, see Section 3.2) 
• Many users become nervous when they feel observed by others; 
this can have a negative impact on their ability to recall and enter 
passwords accurately. Many people feel under pressure when 
there is a queue of other users waiting to use a cash dispenser, for 
instance, and feel embarrassed that others can see they have a 
problem.  They may feel embarrassed because others 
o can observe their ineptitude, or 
o others may assume that they are trying to gain access to 
something they are not entitled to. 
 
5.2 Social and organisational environment: security culture 
 
Study 3 provided in-depth data that showed that good password 
behaviour can lead to social repercussions (see Section 3.2). Users who 
behave according to regulations are seen as ‘paranoid’ or ‘pedantic’, and 
anybody not willing to share their password with colleagues might be 
regarded as untrusting, and possibly even untrustworthy. All this points 
to an important area of further research. For effective security, 
organisations must develop a culture in which passwords are not only 
integrated in people’s work (see Section 4), but security is adopted as a 
shared concern by all employees. In many organisations, there is a wide 
gap between security policies and widespread insecure behaviour.  
Password rules that are unworkable in practice cannot be enforced and 
are thus not taken seriously; since security provides the rationale for 
password rules, it also ends up not being taken seriously.  Highly paid 
key staff often feel that they are too busy to obey “petty” password rules, 
and those in charge of security are often not in a position to enforce 
compliance from these staff.  A sinister side-effect on security culture is 
that being able to flaunt password regulations becomes a badge of 
seniority.  The first step to recovering security culture is to ensure that 
password mechanisms are not unworkable.  Security design has to 
integrate all aspects of security, from the technical to the user interface 
and user training, with the organisation’s work practices and overall 
culture. We believe that security policies, and the way in which they are 
presented and enforced, are a fundamental leverage point that makes it 
possible to move towards such an integration of security and overall 
organisational culture.  However, it will take significant work in terms of 
user education and motivation to achieve a state where all members of 
the organisation accept their role in, and responsibility for, the security 
of an organisation.   We have adapted the use of fear appeals (Roger, 
1975) as a means of convincing users that good security behaviour also 
serves their own interest (Weirich & Sasse, in press).  The main points 
of this approach are: 
1. Emphasise the importance of security for the organisation’s 
business. Show how the organisation’s reputation and business 
would be affected if it becomes known that employees engage in 
behaviour which, for instance, might endanger confidentiality of 
customer data.  Most employees realise that lost business means 
jobs in danger. This gives the fear appeal (and the associated 
punishment) a rational motivation that will raise users’ 
acceptance of it. 
2. Appropriately punish behaviour, not its consequences. Make it 
clear that you can not monitor all the employees all the time, but 
that you will make detailed enquiries about their past behaviour 
in case of a break-in through their account. This behaviour will 
definitely be punished, whether it led to the actual break-in or 
not. 
3. Report security transgressions, rather than trying to keep them 
secret in an attempt not to lose face. Currently, there are few 
rewards for security-conscious behaviour; if regulations are to be 
taken seriously, failure to observe them must be dealt with, and 
seen to be dealt with. This is effectively learning by negative 
reinforcement, which can only be effective if security failures are 
made known to users. 
 
6 Conclusions  
 
6.1  Do passwords have a future? 
 
We have identified a considerable number of usability issues with 
password mechanisms.   At the same time, our analysis has revealed that 
many problems are due to the way in which passwords are currently 
implemented.  
1. Organisations can fight password inflation by moving away from 
designing security on a per-system basis.  SSO, a single userid, 
and password rules that are consistent across systems can help 
achieve this. Also, security must be designed as an integral part 
of users’ work, rather than get in the way. 
2. Judicious changes to password policies can make strong 
passwords manageable.  Organisations can curb password 
inflation by reducing forced changes, and sanctioning use of the 
same password for several systems.  In our view, this entails 
fewer risks than abandoning the cardinal principle of knowledge-
based authentication and move to wholesale writing down of 
passwords, as Schneier (2000) suggests.  Passwords that are 
written down are harder to protect than those that are memorised. 
3. There are alternative mechanisms to 2-step password procedure 
which requires a strong item to be recalled, and these would be 
more suitable for infrequently used passwords. 
4. There are techniques for designing and managing a certain 
number of strong passwords; these techniques need to be made 
available when users need them. 
5. User education will only work if users are motivated. 
 
Nielsen (2000) suggests that passwords are a usability nuisance that will 
be abolished by wide-scale introduction of biometric authentication.  
Biometric systems may be a good fit for some user-tasks-context 
configurations, but not all of them (see Rejman-Greene, in this issue).  
We predict that knowledge-based authentication, in a more appropriate 
form than today, will be used in the foreseeable future. 
 
6.2 Does security need special usability? 
 
Whitten & Tygar (1999) suggested that security needs a usability 
standard that is different from those applied to “general consumer 
software”. We disagree with this view - after all, Whitten & Tygar 
themselves used standard HCI methods to uncover the usability 
problems in the user interface of PGP.  In this paper, we have outlined 
how existing HCI knowledge and tools, properly applied, would go a 
long way towards addressing usability issues in security.  
If there are gaps in the HCI repertoire when it comes to designing usable 
security, they are in the area of (a) user motivation, and (b) a method that 
integrates the different aspects that affect usability of security.  We are 
have adapted the fear appeals from cognitive therapy to make security 
instructions more persuasive (Weirich & Sasse, in press), and are 
currently trialling policies, tutorials and user interfaces that incorporate 
persuasion.  To devise a design method for the whole socio-technical 
system that is security, we are currently adapting Reason’s (1990) 
framework for the design and maintenance of safety-critical systems 
(Brostoff & Sasse, in press).  Safety and security both protect the 
interests of individuals and organisations in the long term.  But they also 
compete for resources with fundamental tasks in the short-term, and are 
likely to be sacrificed for short-term gain.  This tendency can only be 
overcome by making security a visible and integral part of an 
organisation’s long-term goals and its daily activities.    
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